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Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Abstract
The post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union introduced, at least initially, political and economic reforms
simultaneously. This paper explores the consequences of simultaneous
implementation of economic and political liberalization for economic
growth. It is found that democracy indeed had a negative marginal effect
on growth during early phases of transition (1990-93). Nevertheless,
democracy reinforces progress in economic liberalization, which in turn
has a strongly positive effect on growth. When accounting for this indirect
effect, the overall effect of democracy on growth turns out overwhelmingly
positive.
Keywords: Democracy, Liberalization, Economic Growth.
JEL codes: E63, O11, P26, P273
1 Introduction
After the communist regimes collapsed throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, they were replaced (at least initially) by relatively wide-ranging democracy. Measured
by the indices of political freedom and civil liberties published by the Freedom House (see the
Annex for more details), by 1993—two to three years after political liberalization began—the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia attained the same extent of democracy as the United
Kingdom or Germany. Although other countries did not democratize as rapidly as the three
front-runners, they also made considerable progress. Between 1989 and 1991, the average of
the two Freedom-House indices rose from 0.26 to 0.57, on a scale from zero (no democracy)
to one (full democracy).
This speed of political liberalization reflected not only the desire of these countries’
citizens to live in democracy, but also the pressure from Western governments, international
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well as the European Union (which
made democracy an explicit precondition for accession negotiations). This approach, based on
simultaneous implementation of political and economic reforms, stands in sharp contrast with
the experience of countries such as Chile, Taiwan and South Korea, where democratization
followed only after economic liberalization proved successful, or with the current Chinese
approach based on economic liberalization without democratization.
Ten years later, democracy and prosperity are far from being the norm in the former
communist countries. Overall, the outcomes in terms of economic performance and political
developments have been very diverse. While some countries have been successful in
sustaining the reform momentum and eventually resuming growth, others experienced reform
reversals, reemergence of authoritarian regimes and/or protracted periods of economic
decline. The objective of this paper is to examine the economic consequences of simultaneous
implementation of economic and political reforms in the post-communist countries. Did the
early introduction of democracy help or hinder growth of the advanced reformers? Did the
countries that postponed or reversed political liberalization in turn achieve higher growth?
The literature offers an abundance of opinions but no consensus on the impact of
democracy on economic growth. On the one hand, North (1990, 1993) and Olson (2000)
argue that democracy is a precondition for sustained long-term growth and prosperity,
because it guarantees the protection and enforcement of property rights. Similarly, Rodrik
(2000) posits that democracy is a meta-institution that helps create growth-enhancing4
institutions. On the other hand, empirical studies based on large cross sections of countries
suggest that the relationship may be negative (Helliwell, 1994) or at best hump-shaped (Barro,
1996, 1997), but not robustly so (see Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). Barro explains the
negative effect of democracy on growth (beyond an intermediate level of democracy) by
pointing out that democratic countries typically implement excessive redistribution programs.
Democracy can also lead to inefficient policy outcomes, especially in case of economically
costly policies. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that rational voters may choose not to
support efficiency-enhancing reforms because of individual uncertainty about payoffs.
Similarly, Alesina and Drazen (1991) illustrate how war of attrition over asymmetric payoffs
may lead to efficiency-enhancing reforms being delayed. Finally, governments facing
elections may pursue policies that maximize the prospects of reelection, even if these are
detrimental to long-term economic growth.
Experience of the post-communist countries can shed some new light on the relationships
between democracy and growth. The transition process can be seen as a natural experiment,
comprising a group of 25 countries starting off with little or no democracy and being ex-ante
similar (though not identical) in terms of economic development. Subsequently, the paths
followed by individual countries in terms of economic and political liberalization diverged
dramatically, with some introducing democracy and economic freedom essentially at level
with Western Europe, and others reverting to authoritarian rule and central planning. By
observing the variety of approaches to democratization, as well as the outcomes in terms of
economic growth, one can infer new insights about the importance of democracy for
economic performance.
There is already a sizeable literature exploring the relationship between progress in
economic liberalization and economic growth during transition, spurred by the initial
contribution of De Melo et al. (1996). In general, the evidence suggests that progress in
economic liberalization leads to better growth performance (see Havrylyshyn et al, 1998,
Berg et al., 1999), although the progress in liberalization may in part be predetermined by
initial conditions (see Krueger and Ciolko, 1998, and Heybey and Murrel, 1999). The
literature, however, says little about the effect of political liberalization on growth.
Nonetheless, De Melo et al. (1996) and Dethier et al. (1999) observe that the extent of
democracy is positively correlated with the progress in liberalization and suggest that
democratization reinforces economic liberalization and, in this way, has an indirect positive
effect on growth. The direct effect of democracy on growth has been left unexplored though.5
The paper at hand attempts to fill this gap. The analysis explores the effect of democracy
on growth, both indirectly (through facilitating economic liberalization) and directly.
Moreover, the paper studies the direction of causality between democracy and economic
liberalization (the previous contributions merely pointed out the positive correlation) and
shows that democracy indeed causes liberalization rather than the other way around. The
results obtained with a sample of 25 transition economies suggest that democracy is good for
growth, but only because it reinforces economic liberalization (which in turn has a positive
effect on growth). The marginal effect of democracy after controlling for progress in
economic liberalization, in contrast, is negative, at least during the initial transition period.
Hence, democracy alone, if unaccompanied by a correspondingly far-reaching liberalization,
actually appears to hinder growth.
2 Patterns of Growth during Transition
The initial response of output to economic reforms was similar across all post-communist
economies—output declined sharply in the first few years of transition. The subsequent
patterns of growth, however, turned out to be very diverse. While some countries bottomed
out and resumed growth after two to four years of transitional recession, others experienced
protracted periods of stagnation or continued decline. According to official statistics, the
average transition economy saw its real output shrink cumulatively by 42% (this corresponds
to the lowest point on the output trajectory, i.e. not taking account of the subsequent rebound
of output). The range of decline was between 17% (Uzbekistan) and 75% (Georgia), for
comparison, US GNP fell by 34 % during the Great Depression. By 1998, the average
transition economy experienced only a ten-percent cumulative recovery. Only in Poland and
Slovenia output exceeded the pre-transition level of output by 1998. In contrast, Russia,
Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan, reported essentially no recovery as of 1998. Table 1
presents summary statistics on growth as well other variables of interest for the 25 countries
covered by the analysis in the present paper.
Enter Table 1 about here.
It is generally accepted that official statistics exaggerate the severity of output fall. The
statistics directly measure the production of medium-sized and large firms but only estimate6
the output of small firms, which make up most of the new and growing private sector. Over-
reporting under communism (for political reasons) and under-reporting at present (for tax
purposes) also play a role. The official statistics only imperfectly estimate the transfer of
economic activity from the official to the unofficial economy. Finally, part of the measured
output fall is due to the elimination of undesired production, reduction of waste, and fall in
inventories as the shortage economy turned into a surplus one, all of which are in fact
efficiency enhancing development, even though they show up with a negative sign in output
statistics. Nonetheless, even if overestimated by the official statistics, the reform-induced
output fall in CEE and FSU was undoubtedly severe.
Several theoretical explanations have been suggested to account for the output fall. Calvo
and Coricelli (1993) blame it on the credit crunch—credit restrictions and high real interest
rates—due to overly restrictive monetary policy. Blanchard and Kremer (1997), and Roland
and Verdier (1999) develop supply-side explanations based on disorganization of production
(supplier-buyer) relationships due to asymmetric information about outside options in
bargaining, or search frictions and relation-specific investment, respectively. Hillman (1999)
and Hillman and Ursprung (2000) suggest that the output fall occurred because economic and
political reforms were not accompanied by a change of political culture. Accordingly, the
political culture of rent seeking remained in place, and time and resources spent for rent-
seeking activities even increased, thus precipitating the output fall (see Shleifer, 1998, for
comparisons of political elites in Poland and Russia).
3 Democracy and Growth during Transition
Post-communist countries generally implemented, at least initially, economic and political
reforms simultaneously. This approach may have affected their economic performance in
several ways. First, democracy brings about political constraints (see Roland, 2000) that may
limit the government’s ability to proceed with far-reaching economic liberalization and, in
turn, harm economic performance during transition. Second, democracy increases uncertainty,
as future governments may not necessarily continue policies and honor commitments
introduced by the previous government. Third, new democracies without stable institutions
and deep democratic traditions may prove to be easy pray to populists and nationalists. On the
other hand, as emphasized by North (1991, 1993), Olson (2000) and others, democracy7
ensures that property rights are guaranteed and is therefore a necessary condition for sustained
long-term growth.
As discussed in the Introduction, the direct relationship between democracy and growth
during transition has not been explored in the literature. Nevertheless, De Melo et al. (1996)
and Dethier et al. (1999) point out that the extent of democracy among post-communist
countries is positively correlated with the progress in economic liberalization. They argue
therefore that democracy facilitates economic liberalization and thus has a positive, albeit
indirect, effect on growth. Yet, they leave the precise nature of this relationship, as well as the
possible direct impact of democracy on growth, unexplored.
The relationship between progress in economic liberalization and economic growth during
transition has already received considerable attention in the literature (see the discussion in
section 1). Although the discussion is still ongoing, the evidence appears to be largely
supportive of a positive impact of liberalization on growth (although initial conditions also
played an important role). The effect of liberalization on growth can be demonstrated by
means of regression analysis (the sample includes 25 post-communist countries in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union for which data are available, see Table 1). When the
average growth rate of per-capita GDP is regressed on the liberalization index
1, its sign is
positive and strongly significant and the regression produces an adjusted R
2 of 0.57 (in a
regression pooling together observations on average growth over 1990-93 and 1994-98;
besides the liberalization index, the regression also includes the intercept and dummy for
1994-98). When additional explanatory variables are added, the following regression equation
obtains (heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses, see the Technical Annex for
more details on the estimation and Table A1 for additional results):
Growth = 1.41 (1.11) +3.94 (2.88)*D9498 –41.25 (4.75)*LI +57.00 (5.84)*LI
2 –0.43
(1.16)*BRU +0.18 (2.89)*SEC –9.35 (5.80)*WAR +4.73 (2.65)*WARlagged –3.28
(3.00)*GNP89  adj. R
2 = 0.802, 50 observations
                                               
1 The liberalization index used in the analysis is based on the index constructed by De Melo at al. (1996),
and extended by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) using the progress-in-transition indicators published annually by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The index measures progress in implementation
of economic reforms. It is scaled to range between zero (an unreformed socialist economy) and one (a liberal
market economy such as the US. Among the transition economies, Hungary achieved the highest value (0.88) of
this index in 1998, followed by the Czech Republic, Estonia and Poland (0.82). In contrast, Belarus and
Uzbekistan appear almost unreformed (with 0.34 and 0.35, respectively).8
where Growth is the average growth rate of per-capita GDP over 1990-93 and 1994-98 (the
regression thus pools observations over the two sub-periods), D9498 is a dummy variable for
the second sub-period, LI is the liberalization index, BRU is the distance from Western
Europe (Brussels) used as a proxy for initial conditions (thought to be correlated with social,
cultural and religious legacies and institutions, initial economic development, as well as the
costs of engaging in trade with Western Europe)
2, SEC is the secondary school enrollment (as
a percentage of the relevant age category, taken from Denizer, 1997), WAR is a dummy
variable denoting countries that engaged in military conflicts (internal or external) during
1990-93 whereas WARlagged denotes the same countries during 1994-98 (when most
conflicts ended or subsided), and, finally, GNP89 is the log of per-capita GNP in 1989 in
purchasing power parity (from De Melo, 1996).
The results suggest that the effect of liberalization on growth is positive and strongly
significant, although it appears better approximated by a non-linear (U-shaped) relationship
(see also the results reported in the Annex, Table A1, obtained with different regression
specifications). Accordingly, liberalization hinders growth at low levels but improves growth
after a moderate level has been attained. Either no liberalization or complete liberalization is
better than intermediate liberalization. The minimum effect of liberalization is attained with
liberalization index around 0.36, which is close to the average levels of liberalization attained
by Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine and Uzbekistan during 1990-98. Once the minimum level has
been exceeded, there are increasing returns to further liberalization. When considering
patterns of growth over 1990-93 and 1994-98 separately (see Table A1 in the Annex), the U-
shaped relationship appears particularly pronounced during the early transition period (1990-
93). In contrast, growth during 1994-98 is better explained by a linear pattern. Importantly,
the results are sustained also when the liberalization index is instrumented by its lagged value,
a quadratic transition-time trend, and measures reflecting initial conditions (initial GNP per
capita, number of years under communism, and the war dummy—see the technical Annex for
more details). The instrumentation is intended to remedy the possible endogeneity of the
liberalization index, as countries that experienced favorable economic performance may have
found it easier to implement radical reforms. Hence, the results suggest that economic
liberalization indeed has had a strong a positive effect on growth. Next, the analysis proceeds
                                               
2 Of course, better measures of initial conditions would be desirable. However, reliable data are hard to
find, in part because many historical data are not available for the individual successor countries of the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, given the low number of degrees of freedom, inclusion of
many more additional variables would dramatically reduce the feasibility of estimation.9
examine the effect of democracy on growth—directly, as well as via the effect that democracy
may have had on the progress in economic liberalization.
At a first sight, democracy seems associated with better growth performance among the
transition economies. The countries that introduced widest democracy (as measured by the
indices of political freedom and civil liberties
3 achieved the best results in terms of economic
performance. In contrast, some of the countries that implemented only moderate democracy
(for example Russia, Ukraine and Moldova) saw their economies plunge with little signs of
subsequent recovery. This pattern is unlikely to be merely due to reverse causality—faster
growing countries being able to introduce greater democracy—in fact, the countries of Central
Europe and the Baltics introduced relatively wide democracy already at the outset of
transition, before the resumption of growth.
Estimating the effect of democracy on growth during transition is complicated by the high
correlation between democracy and liberalization (the correlation coefficient between annual
values of the liberalization and democracy indices over 1990-98 is 0.66). Democracy then
appears with a positive and significant coefficient when entered in a growth regression
without controlling for the progress in liberalization (see Popov, 2000). However, the result is
strikingly different when democracy is entered alongside liberalization (heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics in parentheses):
Growth = 8.31 (0.75) –1.83 (0.55)*D9498 –26.64 (2.36)*LI +44.89 (4.04)*LI
2 +1.42
(0.38)*DI –8.71 (2.05)*DI*D9093 –0.36 (0.75)*BRU +0.16 (2.92)*SEC –10.11 (5.77)*WAR
+4.91 (2.70)*WARlagged –2.72 (2.16)*GNP89  adj. R
2 = 0.802, 50 observations
with DI denoting the democracy index and DI*D9093 standing for the product of the
democracy index and a dummy for 1990-93—this interaction variable thus captures the
differentiated effect of democracy on growth during the first sub-period (see the Annex for
additional details and Table A2 for further results). Since the regression equation holds the
                                               
3 The democracy index is the average of indices of political freedom and civil liberties reported annually by
the Freedom House (see www.freedomhouse.org). The former reflects freedoms pertaining to electoral processes
while the latter focuses on personal freedoms such as the freedom of expression and association. The average
index has been re-scaled so as to range between zero (no democracy) and one (complete democracy). For
example, the US and The Netherlands are examples of countries with full democracy. Iraq is an example with no
democracy at all. In 1988, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria attained a value of 0.0, the former Soviet Union,
while still non-democratic, scored 0.25, while Hungary was moderately democratic with 0.42. By 1998, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia all attained the same level of
democracy as Germany or the UK (0.92), while Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus effectively reinstated
dictatorships (with 0.0, 0.8 and 0.17, respectively).10
progress in liberalization constant, the coefficient estimate of the democracy index captures
the marginal effect of democracy on growth. Over the entire transition period, the marginal
effect of democracy on growth appears insignificant. Nevertheless, the effect turns out
negative and significant during the first part of transition, as reflected in the negative
coefficient on an interaction term between the democracy index and a dummy for 1990-93,
with the overall effect remaining insignificant. This pattern is confirmed also by the separate
regression for 1990-93 (see Table A2 in the Annex), although only with a marginally
significant coefficient (this can largely be attributed to the smaller sample size). Hence, after
controlling for progress in economic liberalization, democracy was apparently harmful to
growth, at least during the early transition period.
However, the overall effect of democracy on growth need not be negative. As argued by
De Melo et al. (1996) and Dethier et al. (1999), democracy may reinforce progress in
economic liberalization and, because liberalization has a positive effect on growth, the total
effect of democracy may in fact be positive. Indeed, a simple Granger-causality test reveals
democracy does cause liberalization rather than the other way around (see technical notes in
the Annex for details).
To account for the indirect effect of democracy on growth through its impact on economic
liberalization, the liberalization index is replaced by an index of residual liberalization,
constructed as the residual from a regression relating the progress in economic liberalization
to the extent of democracy (see the Technical Annex for details). The index of residual
liberalization so constructed measures the progress in economic liberalization that exceeds the
level that can be attributed to prevailing democracy and political freedom. With this
procedure, the coefficient obtained for the democracy index measures the overall effect of
democracy on growth, i.e. including the indirect effect going through the positive impact of
democracy on liberalization. (heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses, see Table
A3 in the Annex additional results):
Growth = –0.87 (0.8) –9.05 (2.44)*D9498 +20.80 (4.22)*ResLI +27.52 (1.95)*ResLI
2 +10.10
(3.48)*DI –20.02 (4.71)*DI*D9093 –0.11 (0.20)*BRU +0.11 (1.89)*SEC –10.63
(5.22)*WAR +4.50 (2.64)*WARlagged –1.58 (1.17)*GNP89  adj. R
2 = 0.771, 50 obs
where ResLI stands for residual liberalization. The effect of residual liberalization remains
positive and significant at least at the 10 percent level—additional liberalization, beyond the11
level attributable to the extent of democracy, is beneficial for growth. Importantly, the overall
effect of democracy turns out positive and strongly significant.
In summary, democracy indeed has exerted a positive overall effect on growth during
transition through its positive impact on progress in economic liberalization. However,
democracy alone, when not accompanied by correspondingly far-reaching liberalization, has
had a negative marginal effect on growth during the initial transition period. The negative
marginal effect can be ascribed to two factors (at least). First, democracy is associated with
greater political uncertainty, as democratic governments are faced with political backlash in
the wake of short-term adverse effects of the reforms. Such uncertainty may reduce the
incentives for economic agents to engage in long-term profit-seeking activities. Second,
governments facing election may pursue short-term political aims or implement policies that
constrain actions of the future government (see Chapter 2 in Roland, 2000) even if the
outcome of such actions is detrimental to economic performance. Both factors become less
important during the later phase of the transition, as economic and political developments
consolidate.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the repercussions of political liberalization and democratization on
growth during the post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. Previous
literature pointed out that democracy facilitates economic liberalization, which in turn has a
positive effect on growth. The effect attributed to democracy thus is only indirect, whereas the
direct effect has been left largely unexplored. The present paper explores the specific nature
of the impact democracy has had on growth during post-communist transition, accounting for
the direct as well as the indirect effect of democracy. The results confirm that democratization
indeed reinforces economic liberalization—in the sense of Granger causality, democracy
causes liberalization, not the other way around. Economic liberalization, in turn, improves
growth performance. Because of the reinforcing effect of democracy on liberalization, its
overall effect on growth therefore is overwhelmingly positive. Nevertheless, the marginal
effect of democracy—when holding progress in liberalization constant—appears negative,
although only during the early transition period (1990-93). In other words, democracy that is
not accompanied by economic liberalization has had a negative effect on growth during the
initial transition period. Hence, rapid democratization without simultaneous economic12
liberalization may worsen economic performance—possibly because of increasing uncertainly
about future political developments and/or creating incentives for the government to pursue
measures aimed at increasing its political support rather implementing sound economic
policies. Nevertheless, the joint effect of democratization and economic liberalization is
unambiguously positive.
These results have important policy implications. In particular, they show that
simultaneous implementation of economic and political reforms in the post-communist
countries did not bring about lower growth. On the contrary, democracy has a positive effect
of growth because it facilitates progress in economic liberalization. This is an important
lesson for those post-communist countries that retained or reinstated autocratic regimes
(Belarus, much of Central Asia, and until recently Serbia) or may currently be doing so
(Russia), in the hope of improving economic performance.13
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Table 1  Countries in Transition: Indicators of Economic Performance,



















1990-93 1994-98 1990-98 1990-98 1989 1990-93 1994-98 1990-93 1994-98
Czech Rep. -3.65 2.28 85.24 10.54 8600 0.68 0.83 0.854 0.917
Slovakia -6.83 5.86 74.97 24.67 7600 0.66 0.79 0.771 0.733
Hungary -4.78 3.08 81.89 13.36 6810 0.73 0.84 0.854 0.917
Poland -3.05 6.00 82.21 34.94 5150 0.76 0.81 0.833 0.900
Slovenia -4.08 4.28 82.04 21.95 9200 0.73 0.79 0.729 0.917
Bulgaria -7.40 -1.94 63.69 2.23 5000 0.58 0.63 0.729 0.783
Romania -6.45 0.18 74.99 1.10 3470 0.40 0.65 0.396 0.717
Albania -8.83 5.68 60.38 26.02 1400 0.40 0.63 0.479 0.517
Croatia -12.35 5.50 58.58 17.94 6171 0.69 0.75 0.500 0.500
Macedonia -13.05 0.86 55.11 4.09 3394 0.68 0.67 0.563 0.600
Estonia -11.23 4.16 60.76 14.98 8900 0.49 0.80 0.646 0.867
Latvia -14.33 3.06 50.97 8.27 8590 0.40 0.72 0.625 0.850
Lithuania -12.05 2.30 53.47 12.12 6430 0.45 0.74 0.688 0.900
Russia -7.80 -4.82 55.89 0.00 7720 0.31 0.67 0.563 0.567
Ukraine -10.63 -10.02 36.76 0.00 5680 0.13 0.52 0.563 0.583
Belarus -5.35 -0.10 62.69 15.06 7010 0.17 0.41 0.479 0.250
Moldova -12.33 -9.90 32.36 0.00 4670 0.26 0.62 0.375 0.567
Armenia -22.98 5.68 31.00 9.84 5530 0.25 0.57 0.479 0.483
Azerbaijan -14.53 -2.86 36.96 6.65 4620 0.16 0.45 0.313 0.250
Georgia -25.80 3.08 25.38 7.42 5590 0.23 0.55 0.354 0.483
Kazakhstan -6.38 -4.16 61.26 0.00 5130 0.22 0.58 0.375 0.250
Kyrgyzstan -9.25 -1.32 50.39 9.99 3180 0.25 0.70 0.500 0.483
Tajikistan -12.18 -5.76 39.19 2.78 3010 0.15 0.41 0.313 0.067
Turkmenistan -4.50 -11.38 41.99 1.76 4230 0.09 0.31 0.188 0.000
Uzbekistan -3.08 0.44 83.36 6.23 2740 0.16 0.54 0.208 0.050
Average -9.71 0.01 57.66 10.08 5432 0.401 0.640 0.535 0.566
Sources: EBRD Transition Report (various issues), de Melo et al. (1996, 1997), Freedom House, World Bank
World Development Report 1996.
Notes: Output Fall is the lowest level of GDP attained between 1990 and 1998, with 1989=100. Output
Recovery is the cumulative increase in GDP since reaching the lowest level. GNP per capita in 1989 is in US$ at
purchasing power parity as reported by de Melo et al. (1996). Liberalization Index is the unweighted mean of the
indices constructed by de Melo et al., as extended by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) using the EBRD progress-in-
transition indicators. The index ranges between zero (no liberalization) and one (complete liberalization).
Democracy Index is the average of political rights and civil liberties, respectively, both constructed by the
Freedom House, re-scaled to range between zero (no democracy) and one (complete democracy).16
Technical Annex
As is standard in growth literature, most of the regressions are estimated with the growth
rate of per-capita GDP as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, since the previous literature
on growth patterns during transition typically used the growth rate of GPD, results with this
dependent variable are presented as well. Since the objective of the analysis is to investigate
long-term patterns of growth rather than annual fluctuations, the regressions are estimated
with averages of all variables over four or five year periods rather than annual observations
(cf. Havrylyshyn et al., 1998; Berg et al., 1999; and Wolf, 1999, who use annual data). This
approach should minimize the noise component in the data originating from measurement
errors or short-term fluctuations caused by external factors, at the cost of having fewer
degrees of freedom. The transition period is split for the purposes of the analysis into two sub-
periods: 1990-93 and 1994-98. This increases the sample size when running pooled
regressions with both sub-periods, and, on the other hand, allows separate analysis of growth
determinants during early transition (when virtually all countries experienced dramatic output
contractions) and the later period, characterized by stabilization and recovery (albeit not in all
countries).
The explanatory variables are the liberalization index, the distance from the country’s
capital to Western Europe (Brussels) as a proxy for initial conditions
4, a dummy for countries
engaging in military conflicts, secondary school enrollment, and initial income per capita.
Several other variables were tried, most notably primary school enrollment and the
investment, but proved insignificant. The distance from Western Europe is used instead of the
common dummy for the former Soviet Union because it offers a continuous measure of initial
conditions—undoubtedly, initial conditions in Estonia were dramatically different from those
in Tajikistan.
The results are summarized in Table A1. Columns (1) through (4) were obtained by
pooled regressions over 1990-93 and 1994-98 whereas columns (5) and (6) present results
separate regressions over the two sub-periods. The variable of interest—the liberalization
index—appears to exert a significant and strongly positive effect on growth, although the
effect may be non-linear (U-shaped), especially during 1990-93. Nevertheless, even when
                                               
4 For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the distance to Brussels is
estimated as 6,000 km.17
allowing for non-linearity, the worst impact of liberalization is attained at a relatively low
level (0.35-0.39) and full liberalization is clearly superior to no liberalization.
Insert Table A1 about here.
Regressions reported in columns (7) through (9) of Table 2 were estimated with the
liberalization index instrumented by its lagged value (LIt-1), the initial GNP per capita (GNP),
the number of years under communism (YrsCom), the conflict dummy and a quadratic
transition-time trend (the first-stage regression is thus estimated with annual observations).
The resulting fist-stage regression (with heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses)
is:
LIt = 0.343 (5.72) +0.607 (7.85)*LIt-1 +0.010 (2.53)*GNP –0.004 (4.43)*YrsCom
-0.014 (0.93)*Conflict +0.053 (3.63)*t –0.006 (4.32)*t
2           [adj. R
2 = 0.875]
The transition-time trend, t, is set to zero for years preceding the onset of transition. The
starting date of transition is defined following Fischer and Sahay (2000, Figure 1).
The results on the marginal effect of democracy on growth (i.e. the effect of democracy
when holding liberalization constant) are reported in Table A2. The regressions are analogous
to those discussed above and reported in Table A1, with the addition of the democracy index
among explanatory variables. Columns (1) through (3) report the results of regressions
pooling data over 1990-93, whereas columns (4) and (5) contain results of separate
regressions for the two sub-periods. The marginal effect of democracy is insignificant in the
regressions spanning the entire period but appears negative and significant during the first
sub-period. This is evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction
variable in column (2) and marginally significant coefficient on the democracy index in the
regression for 1990-93 (column 4).
Insert Table A2 about here.
The specific nature of the relationship between democracy and liberalization is explored
by means of a simple Granger-causality test. When regressing annual observations of the
democracy index on the liberalization index, and vice versa, the following results obtain
5:
LIt = 0.108 (8.12) +0.720 (15.58)*LIt-1 + 0.166 (3.73)*DIt-1  [adj. R2 = 0.884]
                                               
5 Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics in parentheses. The regressions were estimated with 225
observations (i.e. 9 years and 25 countries). Because of the short length of the series, only one lag was included.18
DIt = 0.109 (4.32) –0.068 (-1.37)*LIt-1 + 0.921 (21.89)*DIt-1  [adj. R2 = 0.771]
where LIt and DIt stand for the liberalization and democracy indices, respectively. The results
clearly show that whereas the lagged value of the democracy index is significant as a
determinant of subsequent liberalization, the lagged value of the liberalization index does not
cause subsequent democracy. The results are analogous when additional variables (initial per-
capita GNP, years under communism, military conflict dummy and quadratic time trend) are
included (not reported). Hence, the causality indeed runs from democracy to liberalization
rather than the other way around.
Finally, to examine the overall effect of democracy on growth, a two-step procedure is
implemented. First, the liberalization index is regressed on the democracy index. This yields
the following estimates (t-statistics in parentheses):
1990-98: Liberalization = 0.185 (5.42) + 0.632 (12.45)*Democracy  (Adj.R
2: 0.759)
1990-93: Liberalization = -0.111 (2.70) + 0.956 (15.34)*Democracy  (Adj.R
2: 0.662)
1994-98: Liberalization = 0.393 (11.06) + 0.435 (8.78)*Democracy  (Adj.R
2: 0.752)
Second, the residual is used as an explanatory variable, denoted residual liberalization,
alongside the democracy index. This residual liberalization measures liberalization beyond, or
falling short of, the extent corresponding to the level of democracy. The results are reported in
Table A3. Again, columns (1) through (3) report results pooling observations over 1990-93
and 1994-98, while columns (4) and (5) contain regressions estimated separately for the two
sub-periods. The overall effect of democracy on growth appears clearly positive, although it
was apparently weaker during 1990-93 (as reflected in the negative coefficient on the
interaction term in columns 2 and 3).
Insert Table A3 about here.19
Table A1 Economic Liberalization, Initial Conditions and Growth
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDP GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -7.438 -0.68 -2.335 -0.21 11.409 1.11 18.264 1.64 16.048 1.46 -15.582 -0.88 6.427 0.61 19.632 1.62 -21.395 -1.23
Dummy 1994-98 4.160 2.92 -8.479 -1.64 3.937 2.88 3.926 2.85 1.768 1.18
Liberalization Index 12.941 4.08 8.752 2.57 -41.252 -4.75 -51.148 -5.44 -40.539 -2.98 22.675 3.13 -29.365 -2.87 -52.121 -2.63 28.103 3.79
Liberalization Squared 56.998 5.84 66.337 6.40 58.712 4.09 48.758 4.45 74.249 3.66
Liberalization 1994-98 20.657 3.12
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] -0.356 -0.83 -0.145 -0.30 -0.427 -1.16 -0.194 -0.51 0.037 0.08 -0.796 -1.47 -0.021 -0.05 -0.112 -0.20 -0.263 -0.45
Sec. School Enrollment 0.1389 1.57 0.097 1.39 0.175 2.89 0.164 2.79 0.088 1.36 0.225 2.73 0.173 3.08 0.083 1.49 0.256 3.62
War Dummy -8.404 -4.02 -9.011 -4.49 -9.346 -5.80 -9.529 -5.73 -10.037 -6.71 -9.518 -5.58 -10.218 -6.60
War Dummy (lagged) 2.865 1.55 4.056 2.44 4.725 2.65 4.981 2.93 4.567 2.92 4.978 2.65 5.079 3.03
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -1.908 -1.47 -1.957 -1.61 -3.275 -3.00 -3.779 -3.11 -3.183 -2.93 -1.939 -1.00 -3.082 -2.75 -3.222 -2.81 -2.196 -1.13
Adj.R
2 0.705 0.757 0.802 0.793 0.735 0.546 0.800 0.723 0.576
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 50 50 50 50 25 25 50 25 25
Min/Max effect at: 0.36 0.39 0.35 0.30 0.35
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. Dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita
(GDPpc), or the growth rate of GDP. Columns (1) through (4) are estimated with observations for 1990-93 and 1994-98 pooled together. In columns (7) through (9), the
liberalization index has been instrumented by its lagged value, initial GNP, years under communism, conflict dummy, and quadratic time trend (see the Technical Annex
for details). The liberalization index is the average annual liberalization index over the respective period, as constructed by de Melo et al. (1996) and extended by
Havrylyshyn et al. (1998). Liberalization 1994-98 is an interaction term between the liberalization index and the dummy for 1994-98. The conflict dummy equals one for
Croatia, Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan. The initial per capita GNP is in purchasing power parity terms, in US dollars. The distance from
Brussels for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is estimated as 6,000 km. Secondary school enrolment is according to Denizer (1997), in
percent. Joint Significance Liberalization is the joint significance level of the liberalization index and its squared value. Minimum/Maximum effects refer to the level where
the effect of liberalization reaches its minimum or maximum in the non-linear specification.20
Table A2 Democracy and Growth: Marginal Effect
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDP GDPpc GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 11.284 1.10 8.308 0.75 15.876 1.32 12.312 1.25 -14.138 -0.82
Dummy 1994-98 4.024 3.05 -1.828 -0.55 -0.965 -0.27
Liberalization Index -40.846 -4.73 -26.635 -2.36 -39.631 -3.32 -35.507 -2.78 16.307 1.61
Liberalization Squared 56.046 5.83 44.886 4.04 57.663 4.97 57.623 4.40
Democracy 0.854 0.22 1.423 0.38 -0.029 -0.01 -8.016 -1.56 4.861 0.90
Democracy 1990-93 -8.709 -2.05 -7.203 -1.58
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] -0.385 -0.82 -0.357 -0.75 -0.196 -0.41 -0.120 -0.25 -0.567 -0.87
Sec. School Enrollment 0.176 2.95 0.162 2.92 0.152 2.75 0.089 1.22 0.267 2.91
War Dummy -9.274 -5.40 -10.109 -5.77 -10.263 -5.93 -10.732 -6.61
War Dummy (lagged) 4.791 2.54 4.910 2.70 5.042 2.82 4.912 2.90
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -3.340 -2.96 -2.724 -2.16 -3.231 -2.30 -2.388 -2.20 -2.453 -1.23
Adj.R
2 0.798 0.802 0.789 0.739 0.530
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 50 50 50 25 25
Min/Max effect at: 0.36 0.30 0.34 0.31
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. See also Notes to Table A1. Democracy Index is the based on
the average of political rights and civil liberties according to the Freedom House and normalized so that it ranges between zero and unity. The indices used in the
regressions are the averages for the respective periods. Joint Significance Liberalization is the joint significance level of the liberalization index and its squared value.
Minimum/Maximum effect refers to the level where the effect of liberalization reaches its minimum or maximum in the non-linear specification.21
Table A3 Democracy and Growth: Overall Effect
Period: 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-98 t-stat 1990-93 t-stat 1994-98 t-stat
Growth Rate of: GDPpc GDPpc GDP GDPpc GDPpc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -3.897 -0.38 -0.869 -0.06 2.925 0.22 -6.848 -0.64 -7.725 -0.45
Dummy 1994-98 4.820 3.31 -9.049 -2.44 -10.004 -2.36
Residual Liberalization 9.961 2.47 20.796 4.22 20.651 3.98 17.213 3.85 16.307 1.61
Res. Liberalization Sqrd. 16.967 1.08 27.522 1.95 29.028 1.92 35.741 1.76
Democracy 13.815 3.23 19.099 3.48 18.811 3.36 9.130 1.60 11.947 2.87
Democracy 1990-93 -20.015 -4.71 -21.412 -4.23
Dist. fr. Brussels [ths km] 0.000 0.00 -0.112 -0.20 0.121 0.21 0.703 1.09 -0.567 -0.87
Sec. School Enrollment 0.142 1.65 0.111 1.89 0.092 1.37 0.012 0.18 0.267 2.91
War Dummy -8.022 -3.60 -10.631 -5.22 -10.853 -4.95 -11.331 -5.35
War Dummy (lagged) 3.714 2.05 4.496 2.64 4.492 2.73 4.912 2.90
1989 GNP p.c. [log, ths $] -2.679 -2.02 -1.580 -1.17 -1.774 -1.10 -1.056 -0.88 -2.453 -1.23
Adj.R
2 0.712 0.771 0.730 0.617 0.530
Joint Sign. Liberalization 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.001
Number of observations 50 50 50 25
Min/Max effect at: -0.29 -0.38 -0.36 -0.24
Notes: Estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics, for the 25 countries included in Table 1. See also Notes to Table A1. Democracy Index is the based on
the average of political rights and civil liberties according to the Freedom House and normalized so that it ranges between zero and unity. The indices used in the
regressions are the averages for the respective periods. Joint Significance Liberalization is the joint significance level of the liberalization index and its squared value.
Minimum/Maximum effect refers to the level where the effect of liberalization reaches its minimum or maximum in the non-linear specification.2008
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